Объединение юридических лиц в форме ассоциации «общенациональное движение «бобек»

INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL 
«GLOBAL SCIENCE AND INNOVATIONS 2023: CENTRAL ASIA» 
ASTANA, KAZAKHSTAN, APRIL 2023 
94 
FEATURES OF THE MONISTIC AND DUALISTIC THEORY OF COPYRIGHT 
Khauiya Saulet 
M.S. Narikbayev KAZGUU University 
Astana, Kazakhstan 
Distinction between moral right and economic right has its root in the development of two 
important theories: the dualist theory and the monistic theory[1, p.17]. The former was developed 
in France and the latter in Germany. The dualist theory holds that an author’s moral right is rooted 
in his personality quite independently of his proprietary interests. As such, the dualist theory 
divides the whole set of prerogatives arising from copyright into two categories of rights –the 
moral right and the economic right. This separation is based on the fact that they serve different 
interest and objective which can be separately identified. The droit moral or moral faculties are 
perpetual, inalienable and imprescriptible whereas the economic faculties are limited in time, 
alienable and submitted to prescription. According to this theory, moral rights are chronologically 
and systematically primordial: they precede the real existence of economic rights and also last 
longer than the latter. If the economic prerogatives secure the authors a share in the income from 
work exploitation, droit moral and its prerogatives secure protection for the personal, intellectual 
and spiritual interests of authors. In view of their importance in modern society, moral rights 
cannot be signed away. 
In contrast, the monistic, or unitary, theory holds copyright itself to include an inalienable 
moral aspect. Hence, it regards all the prerogatives belonging to the author, both personal and 
pecuniary, as expression of a unitary right which guarantees, as a whole, both the intellectual and 
economic interest of the author. In short, it is copyright as a whole which serves to protect 
intellectual and moral as well as economic interests of authors. This is most vividly illustrated in 
Prof. Ulmer’s ‘copyright tree’ where the roots of the tree represent moral and economic interests 
of the author, and the stem represents the unitary and integrated copyright as a whole. The branches 
and shoots growing from the stem represent the different faculties (legal prerogatives) which, like 
the branches on the stem, at times derive their force from both roots – the personal and the 
economic – and at others, draw more heavily on one of them[2, p.118]. 
Accordingly, the proponents of monistic theory hold that the exercise of moral rights can 
serve financial interests while the exercise of pecuniary rights can serve personal and intellectual 
interests. For example, the exercise of the right of attribution has important economic dimension 
in that it is only when his name is correlated with his work, his talent become known in the market. 
Attribution of his name in this case serves to procure new business to him. Similarly, the exercise 
of integrity right may also serve the material interest of the author particularly under such 
circumstances where distortion or mutilation of the work damages its potential market. 
In contrast, when a successful entrepreneur would write and publish his biography or 
business success story profit motive will probably be only of secondary importance. In this case 
he exercises his economic right primarily to serve his moral interest: “to fulfill his personal 
interests of self-realization and perhaps also of vanity” (Ibid.) These examples clearly illustrate 
that “what is commonly called moral right or moral rights, on the one hand, and pecuniary right or 
pecuniary rights, on the other hand, is not so unequivocally moral or economic as it would 
generally appear.” These designations, according to Bodhi: are “rather based on terminologic 
convenience; only taken together all these faculties (legal prerogatives) cover the whole spectrum 
of interests protected by copyright as a whole”(Ibid). He maintains that the so-called dualistic 
interpretation of copyright in French theory is not as dualistic as one would have thought. This is 
so because droit moral is understood more in the sense of a bundle of special faculties within the 
unitary copyright than as a compact and separated concept of copyright[3, p.85]. 

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