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light. Hermeneutic circle is such an inalterable circumstance. This theoretical
construction is Heidegger's "preliminary structure of understanding". To be
sure, the goals of the two German philosophers are different. Heidegger
limited himself to explicating the fore-structures of understanding. His
purpose was ontology. Gadamer, within the context of his own research
objectives, is tempted to present the way in which understanding happens in
its historicity. "Our question, by contrast, is how hermeneutics, once freed
from the ontological obstructions of the scientific concept of objectivity, can
do justice to the historicity of understanding"
1a, p. 365
. In this respect, of
course, Gadamer does not abandon the traditional concept of hermeneutics as
teaching about art. He appreciates Dilthey's contribution to the hermeneutic
tools of search of the spiritual sciences. However, along with them, he also
acknowledges Heidegger, with his view of historical hermeneutics seen from
the perspective of the "circular structure of understanding resulting from the
temporality of human life. [1b, p. 365]. However, resulting is conceived by
Gadamer not in the traditional way as application of theory to practice. It is
seen in that "self-understanding
corrects the constantly exercised
understanding
and refines it from improper adjustments – a process that
would benefit the art of understanding"
1c, p. 365-366
.
What is the hermeneutical circle?
Heidegger defines it as follows: "It is not to be reduced to the level of a
vicious circle, or even of a circle which is merely tolerated. In the circle a
positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing is hidden and we
genuinely grasp this possibility only when we have understood that our first,
last, and constant task in interpreting is never to allow our fore-having, fore-
sight, and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular
conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out
these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves"
2a, p. 124
.
Gadamer testifies that Heidegger provides a description of the form of
interpretation. It is a kind of guide for anyone who takes on interpretation, an
explanatory scheme of interpretation. The term ‘circular’ (Zirkel) used by
Heidegger indicates the functionality of this form. Hence, "an interpretation
is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us"
2b,
p. 122
. The argument he provides makes it clear that circularity is derived
from the functionality of understanding itself. In order for this to happen, a
preliminary expectation of the meaning of what is to be understood must be
formed. Therefore, he affirms that, "any interpretation which is to contribute
understanding, must have already been understood what is to be interpreted"
2c, p. 123
. A terminological clarification on understanding and
interpretation is needed here. Heidegger gives this orientation: "This
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development of the understanding we call "
interpretation
" [
Auslegung
]. In it
the understanding appropriates understandingly that which is understood by
it. In interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It
becomes itself. Such interpretation is grounded existentially in understanding;
the latter does not arise from the former. Nor is interpretation the acquiring
of information about what is understood; it is rather the working-out of
possibilities projected in understanding"
2d, p. 120
.
The functionality of interpretation entails, according to Gadamer:
- being on guard against the spontaneity of ideas,
- being on guard against the limitations of stereotypical thinking habits,
- focusing on the essentials,
- keeping within and focusing on essential things independent of one's
own "value pressure",
- projection (of meaning),
- working out and correcting the (fore-)projection,
- involving the use of fore-meanings,
- revealing the original meaning,
- anticipation of meanings,
- transformation of the fore-meanings into interpretative ones,
- unity of meaning.
In fact, these functional characteristics of interpretation are its
procedural description as well as of understanding itself. Hence,
understanding projects:
- taking into account the possibility of misrepresentation in prejudices
(opinions),
- development of adequate project anticipations,
- confirmation,
- starting with non-arbitrary fore-meanings,
- interpreter’s understanding of the origin and importance of the fore-
meanings.
Gadamer touches upon the question of the possibility of accepting the
difference between the use we usually make of words and the content of the
text we read. For him, this is a challenge. Because:
- there is incompatibility between the meaning and wording of the text
and our experience and wording;
- under certain circumstances – practicing average use of meanings,
- it is difficult to overcome our fore-meanings,
- we can understand arbitrarily others’ opinions. It concerns the
multiplicity of fore-meanings expectations and measure.
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Threfore, Gadamer points out that, "the hermeneutical task becomes of
itself a questioning of things and is always in part so defined"
1d, p. 370
.
There should be one important clarification, "Hermeneutically trained
consciousness must be, sensitive to the text's alterity" [2e, p. 235]. In order to
realize this, the existence of fore-meanings is necessary. They prompt
Gademer’s to make reference to Heidegger and his fore-structure of
understanding. In general, the question of being, in his view, concentrates and
highlights the hermeneutical problem. "Being insufficient to interpret the
essence of being thus far, the hermeneutical situation, has been given the
required originality"
2f, p. 235
. The same question, referred to being by
means of terms of fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception, requires, in
its turn, a critical juxtaposition of the question with metaphysics, whose
origins lie in its history. This is fully compatible with the logic of historical-
hermeneutic consciousness. It is a matter of realizing an understanding along
with its anticipations. The latter should be self-aware, self-controlled by it.
This results in the fact that there is an adequate understanding of things
themselves. Procedurally here, the very understanding reflects with
methodical awareness. This brings us back to Heidegger's definition of the
hermeneutic circle. It is on this basis that he insists that the scientific theme
be emphasized in the construction of fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-
conception. Therefore, with regard to tradition, one should seek to reject all
that would prevent it from being understood as the things were themselves.
What could prevent it are the prejudices. In this sense, according to Gadamer,
Heidegger comes to understand the specificity of historical consciousness.
Once, he establishes, in Descartes and Hegel, the ability of the concept of
consciousness, interpreting existence as being and being present, to have a
source of "intentionality" that understands tradition through the ontological
assumptions of the concept of subjectivity. And secondly, he emphasizes, on
his part, the idea of the metaphysics of the extreme of Kant. It "helps" to
"secure" the scientific theme by engaging in understanding the tradition itself.
This is
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