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214 
have been finally examined" 

1f, p. 372

. He develops his argumentation in 
the direction of jurisprudence and the institution of ‘praejudicium’ 
(preliminary sentence). In the presence of the positive validity of such a 
preliminary sentence or a precedent, its negative consequence stands out. It is 
the Enlightenment that established the negative connotation of prejudice. The 
Enlightenment again treated it as "unfounded judgment" 

3, p. 163: 1g, p. 
372

. Gadamer claims that, "This conclusion follows only in the spirit of 
rationalism; it is the reason for discrediting prejudices, and the reason 
scientific knowledge claims to exclude them completely" 

1h, p. 372-373

. 
But the Enlightenment ‘nourishes’ prejudices, because it imposes the absolute 
self-construction of reason, the authority of reason. At the same time, it also 
protects the authority of tradition. 
On the other hand, there is the Cartesian doubt validated by science, 
including the requirement for the doubt itself and the method. In Gadamer’s 
view, it is exactly what does not fit into historical knowledge, the latter being 
in fact outside the scope of the concept of method. For him, prejudice allows 
for a positive reversal of the dilemma. But as it will be established later on, 
prejudices will prove to be implemented in the historical reality of individual 
existence to a much greater extent than judgments. They will prove to be, in 
their capacity as conditions for understanding, at the starting point of the 
hermeneutic problem. Moreover, in terms of their seeking validity, prejudices 
will prove to be at the core of the theoretical-cognitive question of historical 
hermeneutics. At the same time, at the beginning of all historical 
hermeneutics 
"the abstract antithesis between tradition and historical 
research, between history and the knowledge must be discarded"

1i, p. 388

. 
In the end, though, it comes down to "recognizing the element of tradition in 
historical research and inquiring into its hermeneutic productivity" 

1j, p. 
389

. This leads Gadamer do employ reasoning which considers 
understanding within the context of a hermeneutic condition of belonging to 
a certain tradition. The hermeneutical rule requires that the whole should be 
understood in terms of the detail and the detail in terms of the whole. 
However, it is a circular structure – a circular structure of understanding 
within the framework of the formal relation between the whole and the part. 
Understanding, according to Heidegger, is defined by the anticipatory 
movement of fore-understanding. And that disavows formalism, since it is a 
matter of a dynamic process of interplay between the tradition and the 
interpreter, a game situation. Anticipations of meaning do not have subjective 
basis. The ground on which they occur is a tradition-based commonality, 
which is not a precondition, but is self-produced by the individual connected 
with tradition. Therefore, Gadamer thinks that "the circle of understanding is 

215 
not a "methodological" circle, but describes an element of the ontological 
structure of understanding" 

1k, p. 404

. Hence follows the hermeneutical 
implication of "fore-conception of completeness" concerning meaning, "that 
only what really constitutes a unity of meaning is intelligible" 

1l, p. 404

. 
Completeness guides understanding. In terms of content, understanding itself 
explicates three points: 
1. understanding the nature of things, 
2. understanding and discarding other’s opinion, 
3. agreeing on and establishing the truth. 
This mechanism classifies the hermeneutic rules. 
Firstly, there comes fore-conception. It is derived from experience 
("having-to-do") with the thing. It determines the unity of meaning. It also 
determines call the "fore-conception of completeness". 
Secondly, there is the sense of belonging. It is derived from tradition 
and is fulfilled through the commonality of prejudices.
The starting position of hermeneutics is: the understander is related to 
the essence of the subject matter, the essence of the subject matter comes 
through inheritance, inheritance comes from tradition, hence the understander 
attains unity with tradition. 
A faculty of the hermeneutical conscious: inability to relate to the 
essence of the subject matter through unquestioned singleness - this 
singleness characterizes the continuity of tradition. 
The implication, Gadamer’s conclusion: "Hermeneutic work is based 
on a polarity of familiarity and strangeness […] It is in the play between the 
traditionary text's strangeness and familiarity to us, between being a 
historically intended, distanced object and belonging to a tradition. 

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