Объединение юридических лиц в форме ассоциации «общенациональное движение «бобек»
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Сборник МНПК
| INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL
«GLOBAL SCIENCE AND INNOVATIONS 2023: CENTRAL ASIA» ASTANA, KAZAKHSTAN, APRIL 2023 95 The concept of moral right developed in the continental Europe during the nineteenth century. It first appeared in French law. France is therefore known as the mother country of moral right from whence it spread to all continental European and Latin American laws and into the Berne Convention. Moral rights as such are not recognized in the common law countries except in the United Kingdom where it was introduced as late as 1988. What is denominated as moral right is protected in these countries by such laws as the torts of passing off, injurious falsehood, defamation, unfair competition laws, and so on. Since moral right is essentially a product of European countries, particularly France, Germany, and Italy, it can be better understood and appreciated in all its aspects only with reference to the laws of these countries. Moral rights “stem from the fact that the work is a reflection of the personality of the creator, just as much as the economic rights reflect the author’s need to keep body and soul together” (Masouye, 1978). They are invariably tied to the person of the creator of a work. There are three basic moral rights: (a) right of publication (b) right of paternity (c) right of integrity[4, p.91]. The discussion above clearly points out that the nature and scope of exclusive rights granted to the authors determine the extent of their monopoly power to control or limit the access to their works. The wider and extensive the scope of these rights so much greater is the ability of the authors to exact monopoly rent from the use of their works. Creation of new rights, or any enlargement of the existing rights, would naturally result in the contraction of users’ ability to access the works. This may also occur when courts are inclined to favor the interests of the authors or the right owners by giving a broader interpretation of the existing rights far stretching their scope. Such enlargement and court interpretation, however, may be highly prejudicial to the interest of the users, and against the very objective of copyright – to promote the dissemination and advancement of knowledge - if it went to the extent of diluting the very limitation and exception provided by law in the larger societal interest. Hence, it is indisputable that authors must be rewarded with exclusive rights to ensure adequate generation and flow of creative works. But the scope of these rights must not extend beyond the point that would limit the creation and impede the free flow of ideas and information, the basic ingredients for the advancement of learning. This clearly is the reason why these rights are not absolute rights; they are defined with proper delimitation to their scope to ensure free access to information needed for the wider social and economic development [5, p.27]. Inherent to this is the fundamental tension in copyright law – the need to maintain balance between the rights of authors and the larger public interest, such as education, research, and access to information. Has copyright really been able to achieve this balance? Or is it simply a myth? This perhaps is the most vexing question and the one which ever keeps on nagging copyright. жүктеу/скачать 3,05 Mb. Достарыңызбен бөлісу:
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