Evolutionary theories and the philosophy of science G. S. Levit, U. Hossfeld Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena,
3, Am Steiger, Jena, D-07743, Federal Republic of Germany
For citation: Levit G. S., Hossfeld U.
Evolutionary theories and the philosophy of science.
Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies , 2021, vol. 37, issue 2, pp. 229–246.
https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2021.204 (In Russian)
Philosophical theories proceeding from the history of physical-mathematical sciences are
hardly applicable to the analysis of biosciences and evolutionary theory, in particular. This
article briefly reconstructs the history of evolutionary theory beginning with its roots in
the 19
th
century and up to the ultracontemporary concepts. Our objective is to outline the
dynamics of Darwinism and anti-Darwinism from the perspective of the philosophy of sci-
ence. We begin with the arguments of E. Mayr against the applicability of T. Kuhn’s theory of
scientific revolutions to the history of biology. Mayr emphasized that Darwin’s publication
of the
Origin of Species in 1859 caused a genuine scientific revolution in biology, but it was
not a Kuhnian revolution. Darwin coined several theories comprising a complex theoretical
system. Mayr defined five most crucial of these theories: evolution as such, common descent
of all organisms including man, gradualism, the multiplication of species explaining organic
diversity, and, finally, the theory of natural selection. Distinguishing these theories is of
great significance because their destiny in the history of biology substantially differed. The
acceptance of one theory by the majority of the scientific community does not necessarily
mean the acceptance of others. Another argument by Mayr proved that Darwin caused two
scientific revolutions in biology, which Mayr referred to as the First and Second Darwin-
ian Revolutions. The Second Darwinian Revolution happened already in the 20th century
and Mayr himself was its active participant. Both revolutions followed Darwin’s concept
of natural selection. The period between these two revolutions can be in no way described
as “normal science” in Kuhnian terms. Our reconstruction of the history of evolutionary
theory support Mayr’s anti-Kuhnian arguments. Furthermore, we claim that the “evolution
of evolutionary theory” can be interpreted in terms of the modified research programmes
theory by Imre Lakatos, though not in their “purity”, but rather modified and combined
with certain aspects of Marxian-Hegelian dialectics.
Keywords: biological evolution, evolutionary theory, Darwinism, Lamarckism, research pro-
grammes, dialectics.
Вестник СПбГУ. Философия и конфликтология. 2021. Т. 37. Вып. 2 245